dependent on initial conditions, stochastic elements are also incorporated into the analysis. In this study, the effects of an export subsidy for cotton are analyzed using a linear elasticity model.
(1) Qd = f(Pd) were a cause for concern for U.S. cotton producers, (2) QX = g(Pd -S) particularly during the 1985-1986 period when (3) Qs= h(Pp) world prices reached record lows as a result of a (4) Q = Qs = Qd + Qx variety of factors, including the announcement by where Qd is domestic mill use, Qx is total exports, Qs the U.S. of the new marketing loan program. Beis quantity supplied, S is the export subsidy, Pd is the cause of the volatility of the export market throughdomestic cotton price and Pp is the "supply-inducout the last decade, the direct costs of the domestic ing" price to which producers respond. This "suptarget price program for cotton were often high, ply-inducing" price incorporates both market and causing a renewed interest in export expansion progovernment policy information (Shumway; Lee and grams as a way to increase the domestic price.
Helmberger; Bailey and Womack). More specifiThis study presents quantitative estimates of the cally, following Shumway and Bailey and Womack, probable effects of an export subsidy on the domesPp can be described as: tic cotton industry. More specifically, the objective (5) Pp = Pd if Pd > P of this study was to provide estimates of the ex-(6) Pp = Ps if Pd < Ps pected change in domestic price and direct governwhere P, is the effective government program price ment costs of a subsidy program. To quantify the as defined by Houck et al. effects, a linear elasticity model was used. The linear For the subsidy to be effective in raising the doelasticity model used previously obtained estimates mestic price, restrictions must be placed on imports of supply and demand elasticities to simulate of cotton fiber. Also, under current (1991) market changes from equilibrium. (See, for example, Sumand farm program conditions, most cotton stocks ner and Wohlgenant; Lemieux and Wohlgenant.) appear to be pipeline stocks, and thus only negligible The present study includes an explicit representation changes in stocks would be anticipated in response of the domestic farm programs currently in place.
to an export subsidy. Under more volatile condiBecause the net impact of an export subsidy is highly tions, stockholding could become an important short-run concern and stock demand would need to where Kd is the quantity share of domestic consumpbe included in the equilibrium equations. For the tion, and Kx is the quantity share of exports. purposes of the present study, however, equation (4) Substituting (7), (8), and(9a) into (11) and solving above will represent industry equilibrium. This for dlnPd yields: equilibrium framework parallels that used by Sum--KxNxa ner and Wohlgenant.
(12a) dlnPdd KXNX) Total differentiation of (1) and (2) yields:
which represents the percent change in price if the (7) dlnQd = Nd dlnPd initial price is greater than the effective support (8) dlnQ, = N(dlnPd -a) with a = dS/Pd price. where Nd is the own-price elasticity of domestic If initial price is below the effective support price, demand, Nx is the price elasticity of foreign demand and domestic price remains below the effective supfor U.S. cotton, and "a" represents the change in port price even after the implementation of the exsubsidy as a percentage of the initial market price port subsidy, equation (9b) is substituted into the The change in quantity supplied is more difficult equilibrium condition, yielding: to evaluate because the change depends on the relaKXNXa tionship between Ps, based on government pro-(12b) dlPd = N+ K grams, and Pd, the market price. Because producers
.respond to thehigherofthetwoprices eeposwhich represents the maximum possible domestic respond to the higher of the two prices, three possiprices P. )where dnQ (8),
and (9c) should be substituted into (11), yieldwhere (10) R= (P-Pd) / Pd ing: -K and E is the price elasticity of supply of U.S. cotton.
(12c) dlnPd = K" Equation (9a) represents a full supply response to E -(KdNd + KxN , ) the change in domestic price, resulting from initial Thus, the impact of the export subsidy on domestic price above the effective support price. Equation price is greatly affected by the relationship between (9b) represents the situation where domestic price the announced government program provisions and remains below the effective support price even after the initial market price. (For a graphical treatment implementation of the subsidy, and thus there is no of an export subsidy, see Houck.) change in quantity supplied. Equation (9c) repre-CT OVRNM NT DIRECT GOVERNMENT COSTS sents a partial response. In this case, initial domestic price is below the effective support price, but the When domestic price remains below the target implementation of the subsidy results in a "final" price, total direct government costs for deficiency domestic price above the effective support price; payments can be expressed as: producers respond to the difference between the (13) GC = 0(TP -Pd)Q final domestic price and the effective support price, where TP is the target price, Pd is the domestic price Finally, total differentiation of equation (4) yields without any export subsidy, 0 is the portion of the equilibrium condition:
production eligible for deficiency payment, and Q, (11) dlnQ, = KddlnQd + KxdlnQx is the initial level of production.
(f2) dlnPd = -(KxNx + KdNm)a E -(KdNd + KxNx + KdNmX) where Nm is the domestic elasticity of demand for cotton with respect to the price of foreign textiles and X is the elasticity of price transmission of the imported textile price with respect to the domestic cotton price. Based on the percentage of the final textile price that can be traced to the cost of raw cotton, Wohlgenant found the upper bound of x to be 0.3, and its probable value to be around 0.1. Even using the higher value of X, the effect on the price change is small. For example, with Kd= .5, Km = .5, Nx = -2.00, E = 0.2, and Nm = 0.5 (Wohlgenant's parameter values), equation (f2) yields a percentage price change of 14.5 percent and equation (12a) yields a percentage price change of 14.8 percent. When a more realistic value of X is used, that is X = 0.1, then (f2) yields a percentage price change of 14.7 percent. Given Wohlgenant's results, the choice here was not to include the imported textile effect in this study because it would complicate the mathematical exposition with no important effects on the final results of the analysis.
With an export subsidy, government costs are: export demand for U.S. cotton. This direct elasticity (14) GCS = C(TP -Pn)(Qs + dQs)+ S*(Qx + dQx) ignores the "feedback" effect that changes in U.S. where Pn = Pd + dPd. cotton price will have on the price of competitors' Pn is the domestic price after the export subsidy has cotton. When this price-price effect is included, been imposed, S is the per unit subsidy, (Q, + dQs) Duffy et al. found the resulting elasticity (called the is the quantity supplied after the subsidy has been full elasticity by Buse) to be close to -1.0. In the imposed, and (Qx + dQx) is the quantity of cotton current study, an initial export demand elasticity of exported after the subsidy has been imposed. It is -2.0 was used, based on the estimates of the direct apparent from (14) that increases in domestic price elasticity obtained by Wohlgenant and by Duffy, decrease deficiency payments and thus reduce the Richardson, and Wohlgenant (1990) . The lower direct government costs of this part of the cotton value of -1.0, for the full elasticity, was also used in program. The subsidy, which raises the domestic the simulation. These elasticities represent short-run price, has its own direct costs, however. Thus, the (one-year) responses of quantitity demanded to net effect of the subsidy on government costs dechanges in price. Results of the simulation, accordpends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects.
ingly, represent short-run, not long-run, effects of the subsidy. To estimate the long-run effects, long-RELEVANT ELASTICITIES run elasticities could be used in the framework set For the analysis, estimates of the own-price elasforth in (7) through (12). Because the policy enviticity of supply, demand, and export demand are ronment is rarely constant over many years, it is the required. Fortunately, a set of consistently estimated short-run results that are of interest here. and current elasticities of supply and demand is SIMULATION RESULTS available in the literature.
From Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson (1987) , The relationships described in (7) through (14) the short-run (one year) own-price elasticity of supwere initially simulated for a 5-cent-a-pound subply is taken to be 0.3. This estimate is in line with sidy under the assumptions of a domestic supply previous estimates by Shumway and by Gardner. elasticity of 0.3, an export demand elasticity of-2.0, From Wohlgenant, the price elasticity of domestic and a domestic demand elasticity of -0.3. Sensitivity demand was assumed to be -0.3. This elasticity was of the results to changes in the export demand elasin line with those obtained by Lowenstein and by ticity was then evaluated. Waugh. In developing their separate estimates of Because the relationship of market price to target domestic supply and demand elasticities, Duffy, price is extremely important in determining both the Richardson, and Wohlgenant (1987) and Wohllevel of supply response and the changes in costs genant used the same data sources and approxiassociated with introducing the export subsidy, a mately the same data period for estimation.
3 Thus, stochastic specification for beginning market price although these elasticities come from separate studwas used. Based on producer price data from 1981 ies, they were consistently estimated.
to 1987, price was assumed to be normally distribWhile there appears to be some concensus conuted with a mean of 58 cents per pound and a cerning the elasticity of domestic supply and destandard deviation of 5 cents a pound. The initial mand, estimates of the elasticity of export demand shares, Ka and Kx, were each assumed to be 1/2, have not been consistent. In their review of studies based on sales in recent years. For calculation of of price elasticities of export demand for agricultural government costs, the initial production level was commodities, Gardiner and Dixit report seven estiassumed to be 12,650,000 bales, a figure based on mates of the elasticity of export demand for U.S. production through the 1980s. Percent change in cotton, ranging from -0.02 (Taylor and Collins) to government cost was calculated using the difference -5.5 (Johnson). Wohlgenant used both econometric between the costs calculated in (14) and (13), estimation and calculation to derive an estimate of where (14) represents costs with the subsidy and (13) the elasticity of export demand. Both methods represents costs without the subsidy. The simulation yielded an estimate close to -2.0 for the direct ownwas run 100 times using different observations from price short-run elasticity of export demand. This the price distribution. value is close to that obtained by Duffy, Richardson, Two different policy options were analyzed. The and Wohlgenant (1990) for the direct elasticity of 1990 provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill were ana- Farm Bill, a full marketing loan system is the only Hence, the parameter 0 in equation (14) was set loan option. Knutson, Penn, and Boehm state that equal to one. The 1991 provisions of the 1990 Farm "the marketing loan effectively removes the floor Bill include a 72.9-cent-a-pound target price and a price set by a loan rate that is 'too high."' They also 5 percent acreage reduction requirement. In addistate that the marketing loan "is very effective at tion, the 1990 Farm Bill designates another 15 perclearing out government stocks." Thus, in the initial cent of program acreage as ineligible for deficiency simulation, government stock accumulation was not considered, and the distribution of market price was payment. Thus, the parameter 0 in equation (14) paym t. Ts te p e 0 not truncated by a loan rate. The marketing loan would be less than one. Because this acreage, called provision essentially results in a two-tiered definormal flex acreage, can be planted in a variety of ciency payment, with the government paying the crops, including, but not limited to, cotton, the actual difference between market price (even if it is below percentage of 1991 cotton that will be eligible for the loan rate) and the target price. Thus, marketing deficiency payment is difficult to determine. Given loan costs are incorporated into equations (13) and the specialized equipment needed for cotton produc-(14) of this paper. (See Knutson et al. for detailed tion, however, it was hypothesized that very little of descriptions of the various farm program provithe normal flex acreage would be planted to crops sions.) other than cotton.
4 Thus, 0 was set equal to 0.85. The Results from simulation of the subsidy under the effective support-price for cotton under the 1991 1990 and 1991 program provisions are reported in provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill was calculated as: Table 1 .5 When demand elasticity was assumed to Ps =.80*72.9 + .15*58 = 67.02 be -2.00, and the 1990 farm program provisions were assumed to be in place, the 5 cent subsidy resulted in an average domestic price increase of 7.1 nootion of the traditional loan pro m is percent and a decrease in average government cost dbelow the loan rate, the initial price is set equal to of 10.9 percent. In 100 percent of the runs, governeloan rate and stocks are accumulated so that ment costs decreased. On average, 81 percent of the t o r a o r a o subsidy was passed through to the producers in (15) Q + = (KN dNd) (Pd-LR) terms of higher market price. P When the full elasticity of export demand (Nx = where Q,, is the quantity of CCC stocks, Po is the -1.00) is used to account for induced changes in the price that would have prevailed in the absence of a price of competitors' cotton resulting from a lowered loan rate, and LR is the loan rate. U. S. export price, the export subsidy is slightly less
With the export subsidy in place, the market price effective in raising domestic price and reducing that would prevail in the absence of the loan is government expenditures. In this case, the governcalculated using (12). If this price is above the loan ment saves money 79 percent of the time when the rate, no stocks are accumulated. If the domestic 1990 provisions are in place.
market price under the export subsidy is still below The results of the simulation under the 1991 farm the loan rate, then the domestic market price is once The results of the simulation under the 1991 farm program provisions are similar to those obtained again set to the loan rate and the new quantity of under the 1990 provisions. Regardless of the asstocks accumulated is calclated using (15). Besumed elasticity of export demand, the export subcause of increased export sales with the subsidy, this sumed elasticity of export demand, the export sub-^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^ sidy, on average, reduces government expenditures.
acumulat wi out the subsiy ch Under the 1991 farm program provisions, the export auulated wtut te subsidy. subsidy always saves money, even when the elasticIn Table 2 , results are reported for the export sity of expor demand is assumed to be -1.0. las subsidy under a traditional loan program under both the 1990 and 1991 cotton program provisions. In SIMULATION RESULTS UNDETT R A calculating government cost, a storage cost for cot-TRADITIONAL LOAN PROGRAM ton in the loan program was included. For this analysis, a storage cost of approximately three cents As can be seen by the periods of increase in per pound per year, based on 1990 storage charges, government stocks during the last decade, the marwas used. Outlays for the commodity itself are not keting loan provision of the 1985 Farm Bill is not generally considered a direct cost of the program always effectively enforced. Accordingly, the simubecause, in theory, the commodity will be sold at lation was also done under the assumption that a some future date. In reality, however, expensive PIK traditional loan program was in effect, using a loan programs have often been implemented to reduce rate of 50¢ per pound. unwanted stocks. 6 Thus, the reduction in cost of the domestic programs resulting from an export subsidy expected to be below the target price. When a tradiis probably underestimated in this study. tional loan rate is in effect, the export subsidy is not Even with a traditional loan program in effect, the quite as effective at reducing direct costs of the farm export subsidy usually reduces government expenprogram, but still results in reduced government ditures. Under the 1990 provisions, even when the costs most of the time. Another consideration in elasticity of export demand is assumed to be -1.0, designing an export subsidy is the possibility of the subsidy reduces expenditures 75 percent of the retaliation. Although this study used both a high and time, with average savings of 5.6 percent of the low estimate of the elasticity of export demand, no original costs. With a more elastic export demand, specific retaliation was involved. Retaliation by forthe subsidy reduces expenditures 97 percent of the eign competitors could make the program very time.
costly. Under the 1991 program provisions, the export Finally, the impact of the export subsidy on consubsidy reduces government expenditures 96 persumers was not considered. In the final analysis, the cent of the time when the elasticity of export demand gains to domestic producers and taxpayers must be is assumed to be -1.00, and average savings are 4.3 weighed against anticipated losses to consumers percent. With an export elasticity of -2.00, the subcaused by higher domestic prices brought about by sidy saves money 97 percent of the time, and average the export subsidy. Studies in measurement of welsavings are over nine percent.
fare losses in this case are non-trivial, however, TTT~CONCLUSIONS because of existing distortions due to government ICONCLUSIONS intervention (see Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, chapter An export subsidy may be a method to reduce the 4). Therefore, the question of the measurement of costs of the cotton program when market prices are net welfare changes is a topic for future work.
